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INTRODUCTION
Our judicial system generally encompasses the belief that for
every meritorious claim, a court exists with jurisdiction to hear it.
Likewise, it is axiomatic that if multiple courts have jurisdiction to
hear that claim, there is a way to decide which court has the power to
make a final, binding judgment on that claim.1 This is so because we
assume that a plaintiff will eventually receive a final disposition either
granting or denying relief after a full and fair litigation of the issues.
It seems antithetical to the justice system that an action could travel
endlessly between state and federal court without any resolution.
That situation, however, is not only a theoretical possibility but be-
comes reality when Congress enacts statutes without the rules of juris-
diction, remand, and reviewability in mind.
Imagine, for example, that Congress passes a statute entitling a
defendant who commits a tort while wearing a blue shirt to have the
United States defend the claim on his behalf. Under such a statute, a
defendant who claims that he was wearing blue is entitled to either ask
the United States to certify that his shirt was blue or have a court so
decide. If the defendant's shirt was in fact blue, making the United
States the proper defendant, the case must proceed in federal court.2
On the other hand, if the shirt was not blue-meaning the individual
defendant is a proper party-there is no federal jurisdiction, and the
case must proceed in state court. If the statute grants neither the state
nor federal court the exclusive right to determine the underlying juris-
dictional fact-whether the shirt was blue-two courts could properly
exercise jurisdiction, yet neither has the right to enter a final and
binding decision.
A simple example demonstrates how the circularity problem
arises. Paul, the plaintiff, is injured by David, the defendant, and sues
David in state court. David argues that he was wearing a blue shirt and
asks the United States to defend the suit. The United States declines,
asserting that David was wearing purple. David asks the court to hold
that his shirt was blue, thus introducing the United States as a defen-
dant. Which court, state or federal, should answer this question? The
1 Hence, Judge Richard Posner's recent statement that "[ilf at all possible .... a case
should stay in the system that first acquired jurisdiction. It should not be shunted between
court systems; litigation is not ping-pong." Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592
F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the appropriate method of handling jurisdiction
over claims removed under the Class Action Fairness Act where the class is ultimately not
certified). In Cunningham, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its opinion does not
extend to cases in which "after the case is filed it is discovered that there was no jurisdiction
at the outset." See id. The ramifications of such a scenario, in the context of the Westfall
Act, are addressed herein.
2 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing federal jurisdiction if the United States is a
party).
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United States can remove the case to federal court for that court to
decide whether it has jurisdiction (i.e., whether David's shirt was
blue).3 If the federal court decides that the shirt was purple, then the
court has no jurisdiction over the underlying tort and must remand
the case to state court.4 The federal court's decision, however, is
merely jurisdictional. When David becomes the defendant in state
court for the second time, he can again ask the state court to answer
the jurisdiction question. At that point, the United States becomes
the defendant again and removes again. Herein lies the circularity
problem: the case can travel between federal and state court indefi-
nitely. Appeal provides no solution because the federal court's re-
mand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is unreviewable. 5 By
drafting a statute without regard to jurisdiction, remand, and review-
ability, Congress has created the circularity problem.
Differences between blue and purple shirts aside, however, this
problem arises in actual cases 6 brought under statutes like the Westfall
Act.7 This Note will first explain the origins of the circularity prob-
lem. It will then analyze the four scenarios that the Westfall Act cre-
ates as well as four possible outcomes to those scenarios. Ultimately, it
will present two workable but imperfect solutions: (1) applying Car-
negie-Mellon University v. Cohil1 to require a lower standard of jurisdic-
tional proof, and (2) making the first decision of scope of
employment binding (despite the decision's unreviewability). These
solutions are imperfect because they conflict with two established sets
of Supreme Court precedent that make the Westfall Act and statutes
like it9 a seemingly intractable problem: the first indicates that a re-
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (2006); id. § 1441(a).
4 See id. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
5 See id. § 1447(d) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise ....").
6 See, e.g., Foster v. Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
Foster has traveled between state and federal court for six years and will be the vehicle
through which this Note will explore the circularity problem.
7 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80) (providing that the only
remedy against an employee of the federal government acting within the scope of his em-
ployment is against the government). The statute is commonly called the Westfall Act
because it superseded the Supreme Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292
(1988). See Daniel A. Morris, Federal Employees' Liability Since the Federal Employees Liability
Reform & Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (The Westfall Act), 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 73, 73
(1991). The Westfall Act's jurisdictional procedures result in the circularity problem, but
these complications are not limited to this statute. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2 (2006)
(granting federal jurisdiction in civil suits involving employees of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, a federal agency).
8 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
9 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2.
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mand order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is unreviewable, 10
and the second indicates that an unreviewable decision cannot be
binding."1 These two "rules," in conjunction with the Westfall Act,
create an untenable situation. This Note aims to present a clear analy-
sis of this seemingly intractable problem in hopes that a clear presen-
tation of the problem and a discussion of potential solutions can lead
to a satisfactory resolution. This Note ultimately argues that Congress
should reexamine the Westfall Act with these scenarios and outcomes
in mind, but absent such a perfect resolution, the imperfect solution
of making the first decision binding is preferable.
Although this Note will use Foster v. Hil 2 and the Westfall Act to
analyze the circularity problem, discussion of this problem and its pos-
sible solutions extends to other scenarios arising under the Westfall
Act (as well as to other statutes written in a way that makes a question
of federal jurisdiction depend on a merits-based inquiry). Part I of
this Note presents a background explanation of the Westfall Act, the
scenarios arising under it, and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Part II presents
the possible outcomes under the Westfall Act. Part III suggests spe-
cific congressional solutions to the circularity problem.
I
REMAND ORDERS, THE WESTFALL ACT, AND THE INFINITE
JURISDICTIONAL Loop
A. Foster v. Hill
Foster v. Hil 3 demonstrates that this circularity problem is not
merely theoretical. The factual circumstances of the case provide an
interesting background to the circularity problem that the Westfall
Act creates. On March 5, 2002, Kirk Hill attacked James Foster in a
gym locker room at the Great Lakes Naval Base because Hill believed
that "Foster was Somali warlord General Mohammed Farah Aidid, that
'Aidid' was there to kill him, and that he was authorized to use force
against 'Aidid' in accordance with his SEAL training and under the
Rules of Engagement he operated under while in Somalia."'14 The
military was aware of Hill's mental condition, as he was undergoing
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
11 See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 647 (2006) (citing Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 (1980) ("[Clontemporary principles of collateral estop-
pel ... strongly militat[e] against giving an (unreviewable judgment] preclusive effect."));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1976).
12 No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
13 Id.
14 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, Foster v. Hill, No. 06-2651 (7th Cir. Sept. 7,
2006).
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outpatient psychiatric treatment while stationed at the Naval Base. 15
During that time, the Navy assigned him to "Temporary Assigned Duty
to assist in leading sailors in stretching and exercises. 1 6
On March 1, 2004, Foster filed an action against Hill in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, Illinois for assault and battery. 17 Little did
he know that an odd and little-recognized statutory gap would lead to
his suit cycling between state and federal court for the next four
years.18 To understand the nature of Hill's problem, how it arose, and
how the district court attempted to resolve it, it is necessary to under-
stand how the Westfall Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) interact.
1. The Westfall Act
The Westfall Act, which amended the Federal Tort Claims Act,19
grants federal employees who commit torts while acting in the scope
of their federal employment immunity from suit.20 The statute
achieves this result through two possible mechanisms. First, it allows
the Attorney General to certify that a defendant-employee was acting
within the scope of her employment. 21 The Attorney General certifi-
cation subsection-28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2)-explains the procedural
mechanism by which state and federal courts must handle a claim that
the Attorney General has certified. 22 If the Attorney General so certi-
fies, the United States is substituted as a defendant and, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (4) and § 1346(b), the case must be removed to
the federal court.2 3 Even if the federal district court later determines
that the defendant-employee was not acting pursuant to her scope of
employment and dismisses the United States as a defendant, the court
15 See id. at 14-15.
16 Id. at 5-6.
17 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *1.
18 See id. (describing the case's lengthy procedural history).
19 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2006)).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1). Congress promulgated the Westfall Act so governmen-
tal employees could perform duties within the scope of their employment without fear of
personal liability. See Morris, supra note 7, at 82. The Act benefits the government by
encouraging employees to actively pursue their employment duties without fear of being
sued for those actions. The Act also benefits the employee by providing two opportunities
for a scope-of-employment certification-one by the Attorney General pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2) and one by a court pursuant to subsection (d) (3) if the Attorney Gen-
eral refuses to certify. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2)-(3).
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Once the employee provides his supervisor with "all
process served upon him or an attested true copy thereof," the supervisor gives that infor-
mation to the Attorney General, who can then make a certification. Id. § 2679(c).
22 The statute provides that the Attorney General will defend a suit brought against
an employee if the "defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose." Id. § 2679(d) (2).
23 See id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(d) (4).
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retains jurisdiction over the suit 24 because the Attorney General's cer-
tification "conclusively establish [es] scope of office or employment for
purposes of removal."2 5 Thus, this method of removal creates a final
jurisdictional result; the case cannot be remanded and must proceed
in federal court for its duration.
If the Attorney General refuses to certify that the employee was
acting within the scope of her employment, the defendant-employee
may alternatively petition a court, state or federal, for certification. 2 6
If the defendant-employee petitions the state court to make this certi-
fication, the Attorney General has two options. First, she may permit
the state court to make the certification decision; if the state court
certifies that the defendant-employee was acting within the scope of
her federal employment, then the Attorney General must remove the
case to federal court. 27 Alternatively, the Attorney General may re-
move the case to federal court for the sole purpose of deciding the
scope-of-employment question. 28 Thus, the Attorney General ulti-
mately chooses which court decides the relevant scope-of-employment
question. 29
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
Another provision of the United States Code is relevant to re-
moval under the Wesffall Act: 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This section states
that "[a] n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. '30 The statute
seeks to avoid the delay caused by interrupting a case to litigate juris-
dictional issues related to removal and remand.3 1 The Supreme
Court, however, has interpreted § 1447(d) "to cover less than its
words alone suggest."32 The Court announced as early as 1976 that
24 See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 242 (2007) (interpreting § 2679(d) (2) as prohib-
iting a district court from remanding a case even if it dismisses the United States as a
party).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).
26 See id. § 2679(d)(3).
27 See id. (stating that "the action or proceeding may be removed" (emphasis added));
id. § 1346(b) (1) (requiring a tort action brought against the United States to proceed in
federal court).
28 See id. § 2679(d) (3) (indicating that removal by the Attorney General is permissive
and requiring a district court to remand the case if it finds that the defendant-employee was
not acting within the scope of her employment).
29 See id.
30 Id. § 1447(d).
31 See In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that the apparent purpose of § 1447(d) is to achieve "speed and simplicity"); see also 14C
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &JOAN E. STEINMAN, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3740 (4th ed. 2009) ("In general, the purpose of the ban
on review is to spare the parties interruption of the litigation and undue delay in reaching
the merits of the dispute, solely to contest a decision disallowing removal.").
32 Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007).
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§ 1447(d) "should be read in pari materia with § 1447(c)," 33 meaning
that the bar on reviewing remand orders should extend only to those
remands based on the grounds specified in § 1447(c) 34-cases "re-
moved improvidently and without jurisdiction. '35 Congress has since
amended the statute such that the Court now interprets § 1447(c) to
include both improper removal and lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as justifications for remand. 36 As a result, § 1447(d) now precludes
appellate review of remands based on either of those grounds.
37
3. The Foster Problem
In isolation, either of these two statutes is sensible: the Westfall
Act provides government employees with immunity if they act within
the scope of their employment and § 1447(d) ensures finality and
avoids delay. As Foster v. Hill demonstrates, however, the interaction
between these statutes can cause significant problems.38 The problem
in Foster arose when Hill, who as a naval officer was a federal em-
ployee, requested that the Attorney General certify, pursuant to the
Westfall Act, that Hill was acting within the scope of his employment
when he attacked Foster.39 After the Attorney General refused to do
so, Hill petitioned the state court to make the certification. 40 As a
result, on October 26, 2005, the government removed the action to
federal court for the first time, and on May 17, 2006, the federal dis-
trict court determined that Hill was not acting within the scope of his
employment. 41 Accordingly, the federal court remanded the case to
state court.
4 2
At this point, the case took a strange turn. On December 10,
2007, Hill again petitioned the state court for a scope-of-employment
certification and the Attorney General again removed the action to
federal court, where the district court again determined that Hill was
not acting within the scope of his federal employment and again re-
33 Id. (citing Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976)).
34 See id.
35 Id. (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 342).
36 See id. at 229-30 (discussing the Court's interpretation of § 1447(d) under the 1988
amendment to § 1447(d) and noting, with regard to the 1996 amendment, that "[the
Court] will assume for purposes of this case that the amendment was immaterial to Therm-
tron's gloss on § 1447(d)").
37 See id. (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996); Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1995)).
38 See Foster v. Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)
(noting that it was third time the court had "addressed the issue of remand" and summariz-
ing the case's procedural history in multiple courts).
39 See id. at *1-4; Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 16-17, Foster v. Hill, No. 06-2651
(7th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).
40 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *1.
41 Id. at *1-2.
42 Id.
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manded the case to state court.43 Hill, who by now was familiar with
how this case would operate if it returned to state court, appealed the
federal district court's remand order.44 On appeal, the Seventh Cir-
cuit construed the district court's order-which did not specify the
basis for remand-as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
held that the remand order was, therefore, unreviewable. 45
After the Seventh Circuit denied review, the case once again re-
turned to state court. 46 Hill then made a third petition for scope-of-
employment certification in state court, the government removed,
and on September 29, 2008, the district court ruled on the issue for a
third time.47 In that opinion the district court made the same scope-
of-employment determination and again remanded the case to state
court.
4 8
Although the district court's holding remained unaltered, its
third opinion appeared to respond to the Seventh Circuit's opinion 49
by attempting to clarify the basis for remand.50 The district court ex-
plained that it had decided the scope-of-employment issue on the
merits and remanded the remainder of the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction after determining that Hill was not acting within
the scope of his employment.5I Despite this attempt to make its deci-
sion reviewable by splitting its holding into two separate decisions
(one on the merits and one on jurisdiction), the court's explanation
reiterated its reasoning from its May 17, 2006 ruling 52 and was ulti-
mately insufficient to make the case reviewable. 53
In an attempt to differentiate Foster's case from the more typical
removed case over which the federal court lacks jurisdiction at the time
of removal, the district court explicitly stated that it had subject matter
43 Id. at *2.
44 See Foster v. Hill, 497 F.3d 695, 695 (7th Cir. 2007).
45 Id. at 698-99.
46 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at * 2.
47 Id. at *2-3.
48 Id. at *3-4.
49 See id. at *2-4.
50 See id. at *2 ("We make it clear that there was no defect in the removal, and that at
the time of removal the court had subject matter jurisdiction and the court made a deci-
sion relating to the merits of an issue properly before the court pursuant to the Westfall
Act. However, once we made our determination on the issue of scope of employment,
which was properly before the court, we no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and the
Westfall Act mandated that we remand the case.").
51 See id. at *3-4. The court properly reasoned that if Hill was not acting within the
scope of his employment, the United States could not be a party, and if the United States
was not a party, there was no federal jurisdiction.
52 See id. at *3 ("[W]e conclude, for the same reasons stated in our May 17, 2006
ruling, that Hill was not acting within the scope of his employment when he struck
Foster.").
53 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction each time the government removed the case. 54 Such an
attempt to make the case reviewable fails because lack of subject mat-
terjurisdiction is the only ground on which the court could have re-
manded the case. 55 Although the court's position that its ruling
consisted of two decisions-one deciding the scope-of-employment is-
sue on the merits and another remanding the remainder of the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction-was a reasonable attempt to
provide the Seventh Circuit with jurisdiction over the appeal, that rea-
soning is inconsistent both with the Seventh Circuit's precedent and
the manner in which other circuits have dealt with the same issue. 56
54 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *3 ("Unlike a typical case .. .where the court re-
mands the action because at the time of the removal the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, in the instant case we had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal,
but once we made a determination on a limited issue and found that Hill was not acting
within the scope of his employment, we are mandated by the Westfall Act to remand the
instant action.").
55 If a court decides that a plaintiff does not meet the threshold scope-of-employment
requirement, the United States is no longer a proper party and, therefore, no basis for
federal jurisdiction exists. As such, the court must remand for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (3) (2006) (granting the plaintiff a right to
petition the court for certification); infra note 56.
56 A circuit split currently exists regarding whether the scope-of-employment question
in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is jurisdictional (such that courts decide the ques-
tion under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b) (1) standard) or merits-based
(such that courts must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on a FRCP 12(b) (6)
or FRCP 56 standard). SeeCNAv. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 2008) ("A split
among our sister courts of appeals has emerged on the proper procedure for handling
situations in which jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits."). Although this circuit split
is beyond the scope of this Note, I briefly address it here to demonstrate why the district
court in Foster could not both properly decide the scope-of-employment issue on the merits
and remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit takes the approach
that scope of employment is a jurisdictional question, decided under a FRCP 12(b) (1)
standard. See id. at 143-44. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, holds that a court may
apply a lower standard of jurisdictional proof, assume jurisdiction over the case, and then
decide the scope-of-employment question on the merits. See Montez v. Dep't of Navy, 392
F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Hamm v. United States, 483 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.
2007) (discussing the circuit split).
Pursuant to either approach, the district court in Foster could not have properly de-
cided the scope-of-employment issue on the merits and then remanded for lack of subject
matterjurisdiction. Under the Third Circuit's approach, for instance, the scope-of-employ-
ment issue is jurisdictional and, therefore, properly decided under a FRCP 12(b)(1) stan-
dard. Thus, the district court could only have remanded the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and could not have made a separate merits-based decision on scope of employ-
ment-ajurisdictional question. The Fifth's Circuit's approach is different in that it takes
the view that scope of employment is an issue in which jurisdiction is intertwined with the
merits. As such, that approach allows the district court to apply a lower standard ofjuris-
dictional proof, assume jurisdiction, and decide the case on the merits. See Montez, 392
F.3d at 150. Even under that reasoning, the district court in a case like Foster cannot decide
the scope-of-employment issue on the merits and then dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because, by deciding the scope-of-employment issue on the merits, the court
would have implicitly assumed jurisdiction, meaning it could not then decide to deny juris-
diction in the same case. Although this circuit split is relevant in its own terms, its applica-
tion to the present issue is only instructive insofar as it demonstrates the district court's
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Because the court could not have properly decided the scope-of-em-
ployment issue on the merits and then remanded the case to the state
court, the district court's decision to remand is effectively unreview-
able because the only basis for such a remand is lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 57 Because it remanded the case and indicated that the
remand was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, § 1447(d) pre-
vented the appellate court from reviewing the decision.
B. Four Possible Scenarios Arising from the Westfall Act
As Foster demonstrates, combining the Wesffall Act with a prohibi-
tion on reviewing remand orders can produce strange results. Unfor-
tunately, Foster explores only one of the two ways these statutes can
produce vexing jurisdictional issues. As discussed above, the Westfall
Act gives the Attorney General the option of certifying that a defen-
dant-employee was acting within the scope of her employment; if the
Attorney General declines to do so and the defendant-employee peti-
tions a court to make the decision, then the Westfall Act gives the
Attorney General authority to decide which court will rule on the is-
sue. 58 As a result, four possible scenarios could arise under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d) (3), each originating with a plaintiff who sues a government
employee in state court. In each scenario, the defendant-employee
petitions the Attorney General to certify that the underlying tort oc-
curred while she was acting within the scope of her employment, the
Attorney General refuses to certify, and the defendant-employee peti-
tions the state court to certify the scope-of-employment issue. Al-
though the first two scenarios create no procedural difficulties, the
third and fourth produce the untenable circularity problem that this
Note aims to resolve.
Scenario 1. The Attorney General chooses not to remove the case
from state court. The state court denies the defendant-employee's pe-
tition, and the case proceeds as a tort action in state court with the
original plaintiff and defendant as the parties. This scenario is not
problematic.
Scenario 2. The Attorney General removes to federal court before
the state court rules on the petition for certification. The federal
court then affirmatively certifies scope of employment. At that point,
the United States becomes the party defendant pursuant to
inability to provide the Seventh Circuit with jurisdiction to review its remand order by
splitting its decision into two parts.
57 If the district court's only aim were to make the decision reviewable, it could have
applied a lower standard of proof for scope of employment as it related to jurisdiction,
assumed jurisdiction, and then decided the case on the merits. See Montez, 392 F.3d at 150.
This approach, however, would have been disingenuous considering the court's previous
decisions.
58 See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
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§ 2679(d) (4), and the case proceeds in federal court with the original
plaintiff and the United States as the parties. Like Scenario 1, no
problem arises.
Scenario 3. The Attorney General chooses not to remove the case
from state court. The state court grants the defendant's petition, cer-
tifying that she acted within the scope of her employment. As a result,
"the United States [is] substituted as the party defendant" and the
"action . . . proceed[s] in the same manner as any action against the
United States filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. §] 1346(b) ."59 Because
§ 1346(b) (1) gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over "civil ac-
tions on claims against the United States," the case must proceed in
federal court.60
Unlike Scenarios 1 and 2, this situation creates problems. Be-
cause Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h) (3) mandates dismissal of
any action in which the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion,61 the federal court must independently review its own jurisdic-
tion even if the state court previously concluded that a basis for federal
jurisdiction exists. Thus, if the case in which the United States is the
party defendant is removed to the district court, the district court
must itself examine whether it has jurisdiction over the case. This ex-
amination requires the court to look again to the scope-of-employ-
ment issue, as the court has no jurisdiction over the underlying state-
based tort claim if the employee was not acting within the scope of her
employment.
Such an examination of scope of employment could have two re-
sults. Either the district court agrees that the employee was acting
within the scope of her employment (in which case the United States
is a proper party and the district court has jurisdiction) or the district
court concludes that the employee was not so acting (in which case
the United States is an improper party). The former presents no
problem; however, in the latter situation, the district court must dis-
miss the United States as a party unless the case presents some other
basis for federal jurisdiction. 62 Here, the circularity problem arises. 63
59 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3)-(4); see id. § 1346(b)(1).
60 See id. § 1346(b) (1).
61 FED. R. Cv. P. 12(h)(3).
62 See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 (illustrating the limited jurisdiction of federal courts); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367, 1441 (same); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3) (same).
63 After the district court dismisses the United States as a party, it no longer has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the case and must remand to state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d) (3). But if the defendant-employee then petitions the state court for a scope-of-
employment certification (a reasonable request because nothing in the Westfall Act pre-
vents doing so and the state court may be predisposed to rule in the defendant's favor
based on its previous decision), the state court could certify again, consistent with its previ-
ous decision, and the case must be removed to federal court again. This would create the
same circularity problem present in Foster.
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Scenario 4. Prior to the state court issuing a decision on the scope-
of-employment issue, the Attorney General removes to the district
court. The district court denies the defendant's petition, refusing to
certify scope of employment, and remands to state court.64 Such a
remand on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction 65 is unre-
viewable. 66 This is the Foster v. Hill scenario.
Again, this situation creates a potential circularity problem.
When the case returns to state court, nothing prevents the defendant
from again petitioning the state court to certify the scope-of-employ-
ment issue. If the state court reexamines the issue and certifies that
the defendant was acting within the scope of her employment, then
the state court has effectively contradicted the federal court. At that
point the United States would be substituted as a party, and the case
must be removed to federal court. Having already decided that it
does not have jurisdiction, the district court would have to remand
the case back to state court. Such is the untenable circularity problem
that arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d) (3), the problem that this Note
attempts to resolve.
II
SCENARIos 3 AND 4 AND THEIR OUTCOMES
As explained above, Scenarios 3 and 4 create circularity problems
that could continue indefinitely. The potential for the circularity
problem exists within the Westfall Act 6 7 because the statute does not
clearly delineate which court, state or federal, should decide the
scope-of-employment issue, enabling those courts to issue contradic-
tory orders and opinions. The state court could hold that the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of her employment, which requires
that the case proceed in federal court. The federal court could, in
that same case, decide that the employee was not acting within the
scope of her employment, stripping the federal court of its jurisdic-
tion and requiring remand to state court.6 The case could thus con-
tinue to cycle indefinitely between federal and state court with the
state court finding that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction and
64 Id. ("If, in considering the petition, the district court determines that the employee
was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding shall
be remanded to the State Court." (emphasis added)).
65 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (generally prohibiting review of a federal court's remand
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Foster v. Hill, 497 F.3d 695, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2007);
infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
67 The situation could also result from any similarly drafted statute that permits both
a federal and state court to decide an issue that is both jurisdictional and relevant to the
merits.
68 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (3).
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the federal court later holding that it does not have jurisdiction. Simi-
larly, the circularity problem could arise as it did in Foster, where the
Attorney General removes to federal court each time the defendant
petitions the state court (but before the state court decides the scope-
of-employment issue) such that the federal court repeatedly makes
the same decision, finding the defendant-employee did not act within
the scope of her employment and then remanding the case as the
Westfall Act requires. 69
Congress could not have intended to create an endless loop be-
tween federal and state courts when it drafted the Westfall Act. Not
only does such a loop create an untenable jurisdictional conundrum,
but it also results in a significant waste ofjudicial resources by allowing
two courts to repeatedly make the same determinations in the same
case. There are four possible outcomes to this circularity problem,
only two of which are reasonable solutions.
A. Outcome 1: Looping Between State and Federal Court
The first possible outcome contemplates that neither court exclu-
sively decides the scope-of-employment issue. In this situation, the
statute vests either court with the power to certify scope of employ-
ment. Thus, the defendant-employee may petition the state court to
certify that she was acting within the scope of her federal employ-
ment; the Attorney General may remove the case so that a federal
court decides the certification issue, and the federal court can refuse
to so certify. After the federal court remands the case, the state court
may decide that the defendant-employee actually was acting within
the scope of her employment. Under the Westfall Act, this state-court
determination would require that the United States be substituted as a
party defendant and, therefore, mandate removal to federal court.
70
After the case returns to federal court, that court must examine its
own jurisdiction-a determination that depends on whether the de-
fendant acted within the scope of her federal employment.71 At this
point, however, the federal court has already determined that the de-
fendant was not acting within the scope of her federal employment
and is bound by that determination. The loop thus restarts because
the district court must dismiss the United States for being an im-
proper party, eliminating the basis for federal jurisdiction.
This outcome parallels Scenario 4. Because Congress did not vest
the power to make the scope-of-employment decision in either state
or federal court, both have equal authority to make such a decision.
Because the statute does not limit the number of times the defendant
69 See Foster v. Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
70 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); id. § 2679(d)(4).
71 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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can petition for a scope-of-employment determination, 72 if a federal
court remands a Westfall Act case to a state court after refusing to
certify that the defendant-employee was acting within the scope of her
federal employment, the defendant can petition again for a scope-of-
employment determination. Because the state court could potentially
make a decision contrary to the Attorney General's certification, the
Attorney General can, and reasonably would, again remove the case to
the federal court.
Congress could not have intended to create a continuous loop
between state and federal court in this manner. Not only does this
outcome waste significant judicial resources by requiring two courts to
continue hearing the same issues in the same case but it also harms
the parties by preventing the court from granting any relief to a plain-
tiff-exactly what has happened to the plaintiff in Foster.73 This read-
ing of the statute is therefore not viable because it perpetuates the
circularity problem rather than alleviating it.
B. Outcome 2: The Federal Court's Decision Is Binding
A second solution to the circularity problem involves reading the
statute to vest the power to make the scope-of-employment decision
solely in the federal court. This interpretation solves the circularity
problem as long as the federal court is the first to decide the scope-of-
employment issue. If the Attorney General removes the case to fed-
eral court immediately upon the defendant's petition, no circularity
problem arises because the statute would require the federal court's
decision to bind the state court. In that situation, if the federal court
determined that the employee was acting within the scope of her of-
fice or employment, then the United States would become the party
defendant, and the case would proceed in federal court.7 4 If the fed-
eral court determined that the employee was not acting within the
scope of her employment, then the court would deny the defendant's
petition and remand to state court. As long as the federal court's de-
cision binds the state court in this instance, 75 no further circularity
problem arises because the state court would apply the federal court's
scope-of-employment decision and proceed with the case as a typical
tort action where the original plaintiff and defendant are the parties.
This outcome presents a problem, however, if the Attorney Gen-
eral does not remove the case as soon as the defendant petitions for a
scope-of-employment certification. If the Attorney General exercises
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).
73 Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *1, *5.
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); id. § 2679(d)(3)-(4).
75 There is some question as to whether such a decision would be binding on the state
court. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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her discretion and allows the case to remain in state court, that state
court can then decide the issue. If the state court concludes that the
employee was not acting within the scope of her employment, the case
proceeds as a typical tort action in state court. If, however, the state
court decides that the employee was acting within the scope of her
employment, then the United States must be substituted as a party.
Consequently, the case must be removed to federal court.
7 6
This removal is problematic if the statute itself vests ultimate
power in the federal court to determine the scope-of-employment is-
sue. After the case entered federal court, the district court would re-
examine whether the defendant-employee acted in the scope of her
employment. Essentially, this process results in a federal court sitting
as an appellate court over the state courts-a hierarchy our judicial
system considers improper.77 This result also necessitates a tremen-
dous waste of judicial resources because the statute permits the Attor-
ney General to leave a case in state court for a decision regarding the
scope of employment 78 only to require removal of the case (provided
the state court certifies scope of employment) for federal-court deter-
mination of the same issue. Congress could not have intended for a
case to travel such a pointless journey through the judicial system.
Therefore, reading the statute to vest ultimate authority in the federal
court, while permitting the Attorney General discretion as to removal
prior to a scope-of-employment determination, is antithetical to the
statute's language and purpose.
C. Outcome 3: Apply the Cohill Doctrine
Another resolution to the circularity problem is to require a fed-
eral court to apply a lower standard of proof for the jurisdictional
scope-of-employment determination.7 9 If the federal district court de-
termines that the employee was acting within the scope of her employ-
ment under this lower standard of proof, the court could assume
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); id. § 2679(d)(3)-(4).
77 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.
1970) ("[L]ower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribu-
nals .... ."); see also At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296
(1970) ("[Llower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state
court decisions."); Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Mat-
terJurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 859, 859-60 (1990) (indicating
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "stands for the proposition that federal district courts do
not have jurisdiction to review the judgments of state courts").
78 The statute grants the Attorney General the discretion to remain in state court for
a scope-of-employment decision because it speaks in permissive terms. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d) (3) ("[T]he action or proceeding may be removed without bond by the Attorney
General ... ." (emphasis added)).
79 See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 973, 1006-08 (2006)
(discussing standard-of-proof difficulties that arise when jurisdictional issues overlap with
the merits of a case).
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jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits, thereby preventing any
remand and effectively eliminating the circularity problem. Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohills ° allows the district court to retain jurisdic-
tion over purely state-law claims even if it determines on the merits-
after determining under a lower standard of proof that the employee
was acting within her scope of employment-that the employee was
not acting within the scope of her employment and subsequently dis-
misses the United States as a party. In Osborn v. Haley,8 1 the Supreme
Court supported this application of Cohill to the Westfall Act, holding
that the district court could, and should, retain jurisdiction over the
purely state-law claims that remained after the district court disagreed
with the Attorney General's certification and denied substitution of
the United States as a party.8 2 In Osborn, the Supreme Court ex-
amined the jurisdictional issue that would arise if the district court
decided that the employee was not acting within the scope of her em-
ployment. The Court stated that the
question [of lacking a federal question basis for court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction] would arise only if, after full consideration, the Dis-
trict Court determines that Haley in fact engaged in the tortious
conduct outside the scope of his employment charged in Osborn's
complaint. At that point, however, little would be left to adjudicate,
at least to Haley's liability.8 3
The Court then indicated that the lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion would not be a judicially resolvable problem at that point
[b] ecause a significant federal question (whether Haley has Westfall
Act immunity) would have been raised at the outset, the case would
"aris[e] under" federal law, as that term is used in Article III. Even
if only state-law claims remained after resolution of the federal ques-
tion, the District Court would have discretion, consistent with
Article III, to retain jurisdiction.8 4
The Court's analysis in Osborn, in conjunction with Cohill,
presents a workable solution to the Westfall Act's circularity problem.
Although the Osborn Court based its decision on the differences be-
tween 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2) and § 2679(d) (3), the Court's analysis
of the district court's ability to retain jurisdiction after analyzing the
entire case on the merits and deciding that the defendant did not act
within the scope of her employment applies to cases arising under
§ 2679(d)(3). The differences between § 2679(d) (2) and (3) are ap-
80 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
81 549 U.S. 225 (2007).
82 See id. at 245.
83 Id. at 244.
84 Id. at 244-45 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983)
and Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350-51).
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propriately considered by applying a lower standard of proof to the
threshold scope-of-employment issue for jurisdictional purposes.8 5
Applying the lower standard of proof to the scope-of-employment
question for the purpose of determining jurisdiction allows the court
not only to fully examine the merits of the case, but also to dismiss
actions that assert Westfall Act immunity in laughable claims. Such a
solution means that federal courts will likely examine more Westfall
Act claims; however, this resolution is beneficial because it solves the
circularity problem without the district court assuming jurisdiction-
so long as a lower standard of proof is met-and then dismissing the
case on the merits if it decides the defendant-employee did not act
within the scope of her employment. Such a decision on the merits
would then be fully reviewable by the appellate court.
The problem with using the Cohill doctrine to solve the circularity
problem is twofold. First, it resolves only Scenario 4 and does not
address the problem of Scenario 3. Second, it requires stretching Su-
preme Court precedent and reading the Westfall Act in a way that
Congress did not intend. Although Osborn held that the district court
should retain jurisdiction even if it disagreed with the Attorney Gen-
eral's scope-of-employment determination, it did so based on a logical
reading of the statute. The differences between § 2769(d) (2) and
(d) (3) are significant in that the former explicitly states that the Attor-
ney General's certification "shall conclusively establish scope of office
or employment for purposes of removal."86 Subsection (d) (3) has no
similar provision, and although this outcome suggests that the district
court could still remand if the initial examination of jurisdiction
proved that the defendant-employee did not act within the scope of
her employment, allowing a lower standard of proof would essentially
read a clause similar to that of § 2679(d) (2) into § 2679(d) (3). Such
a reading would significantly increase the number of purely state-law
based tort cases the federal courts would hear, which is not something
Congress intended. Although such a reading would solve the circular-
ity problem, the statutory language does not support it.
D. Outcome 4: The First Scope-of-Employment Decision
Controls
Congress could not have intended to create an infinite loop be-
tween federal and state court, nor could it have intended to waste
valuable judicial resources by requiring the state court to make a non-
binding scope-of-employment decision that the federal court would
then reexamine. Thus, the only plausible reading of the Westfall Act
85 See Clermont, supra note 79, at 1006-08.
86 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2) (2006) (emphasis added).
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is that the first decision on scope of employment-whether made by a
state or federal court-controls for that case. This reading of the stat-
ute is sensible because the Westfall Act permits, but does not require,
the Attorney General to remove the case to federal court if a defen-
dant-employee petitions for a certification.8 7 Such discretion means
that Congress contemplated that either the federal or state court could
decide the scope-of-employment issue.
Most importantly, this reading eliminates the circularity problem.
If the first scope-of-employment decision is binding, then no further
looping can occur. If, for example, a state court decides the defen-
dant-employee acted within the scope of her employment and this de-
cision binds the federal court (even if solely for the purposes of
jurisdiction), then remand to state court is impossible. Similarly, if
the federal court makes the first decision regarding scope of employ-
ment and that decision binds the state court, then removal is
impossible.
The difficulty with this solution is the actual ability of either a
state court or a federal court to bind the other, whether prior to re-
moval or after remand. Varying perspectives exist on whether a state-
court decision can bind a federal court8  and whether a federal-court
decision can bind a state court.8 9 To whatever extent a federal court's
decision can bind a state court, the decision must be final, and to be
final it must be reviewable.
87 See id. § 2679(d) (3).
88 See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478.4 (2d ed. 2002); see also Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d
1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998) ("In the context of removal, once the case is in federal court,
the state court orders issued prior to removal are not conclusive but remain binding until
they are set aside."). In a single lawsuit, law of the particular case-in the form of orders
and judicial rulings-limits relitigation of an issue; law of the case is not a binding limita-
tion on the court's power, but "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse
to reopen what has been decided." Id. at 1037 n.8 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)); see also Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 n.1
(9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that law of the case "does not require a district judge to follow
an erroneous legal ruling of another trial judge").
89 See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S, 633, 647 (2006) ("While the state court
cannot review the decision to remand in an appellate way, it is perfectly free to reject the
remanding court's reasoning .... "); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1999) (explaining that comity and cooperation between state and federal courts
are "essential to the federal design"); see also Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of
Appeals'Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to Applying Court ofAppeals'Federal Law Holdings and
Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REv. 1, 17-23 (2006) (discussing the impact of
federal court of appeals' precedent on state courts).
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1. Reviewability: A Prerequisite to Finality
a. Rules of Reviewability and Finality
A federal district court's decision is final and binding only if it is
reviewable; a non-reviewable decision cannot bind a state court.90 Sec-
tion 1447(d), however, makes it difficult for a district court's remand
order to be considered a final decision because it prohibits appellate
review of those orders.91
The reviewability of remand orders causes courts great difficulty.
As recently as May 2009, the Supreme Court struggled with the issue.
In Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,92 the Court recounted the
history of the prohibition of appellate review of remand orders. Al-
though that opinion focused on remands of state-law claims when a
federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (a situa-
tion very different from one arising under the Westfall Act, which in-
volves original, rather than supplemental jurisdiction), the
background the Court provided and an analysis of its current perspec-
tive is essential to understanding this prohibition and the manner in
which it creates the circularity problem.
In Carlsbad Technology the Court had an opportunity to reexamine
its precedent involving § 1447(d). 93 The case originated when HIF
Bio, Inc. filed a complaint alleging violations of both state law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) ,94 a fed-
eral law. The case was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c), 95 but
when the district court found that HIF Bio had not raised a valid
RICO claim, it dismissed the RICO charges and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 96 The
court, therefore, remanded the case back to state court.97 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit stated that the remand was for lack of subject mat-
terjurisdiction and refused to review the district court's decision pur-
suant to § 1447(c) and § 1447(d). 98
Section 1447(d) does not specify which of the district court's re-
mand orders are reviewable. Instead, it merely states that "[a]n order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
90 See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 647; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
92 129 S. Ct. 1862 (2009).
93 See id.
94 See id. at 1865; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
95 Section 1441(c) permits the removal of an action from state court if a separate
claim that gives rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is joined with
an "otherwise non-removable claim[ ]." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c); see id. § 1331.
96 See Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1865.
97 See id.
98 See id.
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reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 99 The Supreme Court consist-
ently has interpreted § 1447(d) as prohibiting review of remand or-
ders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 0 0 Although four justices
questioned this operation of § 1447(d) in the Court's most recent de-
cision on this topic (albeit for different reasons and desiring different
outcomes), the Court continues to hold that remands for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction are unreviewable. 0 1
b. The Role of Reviewability in Foster
Because the Supreme Court continues to hold that § 1447(d)
prohibits appellate review of remand orders for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the district court in Foster had to overcome that problem
in order to make its decision final. The only way to make its decision
final, however, was to assert that its remand was not for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction-precisely what the district court in Foster at-
tempted to do. Understandably seeking a final resolution to the case
(and not wanting to continue rehearing the same case and redeciding
the same issue), the district court's third opinion partially responded
to the Seventh Circuit, which had declined review on the basis of
§ 1447(d).1 0 2
99 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
100 See supra Part I.A.2.
101 See Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1865-66. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred
but elaborated that if he were writing on a clean slate-that is, if Thermtron had not been
decided as it had-he would read the text of § 1447(d) literally and prohibit appellate
review of allremand orders. See id. at 1868 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Antonin Scalia
concurred but noted that "Thermtron was questionable in its day and is ripe for reconsidera-
tion in the appropriate case." Id. at 1868 (Scalia, J., concurring). He referred to the juris-
prudence of § 1447(d) as a "mess-entirely of [the Court's] own making" and argued for
reconsideration of Thermtron. Id. at 1869. Justice Stephen Breyer,joined by Justice David
Souter, also concurred, noting that the Court's § 1447(d) jurisprudence causes undesir-
able results by allowing appellate review of a decision that would "rarely involve[ ] major
legal questions, and that (even if wrong) . . . [would] not often have major adverse conse-
quences" while simultaneously prohibiting appellate review of remand orders in cases "pre-
sent[ing] a difficult legal question . .. [that] (if wrong) [would have] potentially serious
adverse consequences." Id. at 1869 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer further called
for legal scholarship reexamining § 1447(d) "with an eye toward determining whether stat-
utory revision is appropriate." Id. at 1869-70.
A rule that prohibits appellate review of all remand orders would only exacerbate the
circularity problem addressed in this Note, unless courts also revised the rule that an unre-
viewable decision is not binding. The Justices who argued against allowing appellate re-
view of a remand order did not discuss the implications of such a rule on the circularity
problem. There has been a plethora of legal scholarship examining the benefits and draw-
backs of § 1447(d), and those discussions will not be recounted herein. E.g., Deborah J.
Challener &John B. Howell, III, Remand and Appellate Review Wen a District Court Declines to
Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 81 TEMP. L. REv. 1067, 1075-89
(2008) (discussing the relationship between § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) and their implica-
tions for supplemental jurisdiction).
102 Foster v. Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WiL 4442605, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
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In that opinion, the district court in Foster stated that its remand
was not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it "had jurisdic-
tion at the outset of [the] case to adjudicate Hill's scope of employ-
ment,"10 3 and after it adjudicated that issue on the merits, its
"adjudication on the scope of employment issue resulted in the court
losing jurisdiction to deal further with the merits of the case since the
Government was not substituted as a party."10 4 Essentially, the court
divided its ruling into two parts-one deciding the scope-of-employ-
ment issue on the merits and the other remanding the remainder of
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although this division
was a reasonable attempt to provide the Seventh Circuit with jurisdic-
tion over the appeal, it was inconsistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent1 0 5 as well as decisions from other circuits dealing with the scope-
of-employment issue.' 0 6 This inconsistency exists because a remand
order under § 2679(d) (3) could have no basis other than lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.10 7
The district court's dual opinion is contrary to the Supreme
Court's decision in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust.'0 8 In Kircher, the
Supreme Court unified the competing precedent from the Seventh
Circuit and the Second and Ninth Circuits over reviewability of a re-
mand order issued pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).109 Those circuits divided on the issue of
whether the court should properly characterize the remand order as
one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or as "an order remanding a
case over which the court once had adjudicatory authority but no
longer does.""10 SLUSA gave the district court jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the statute's preclusion provision destroyed state
claims."' If the court held that the provision did not destroy these
state claims, the district court would then have to remand the ac-
tion. 1 2 The Seventh Circuit held that if the action was properly re-
moved, then the remand order was reviewable because the "district
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 644 (2006) ("[If a district court
remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it does so] because its adjudicatory power
has been exercised and its work is done. But its adjudicatory power is simply its authority
to determine its own jurisdiction to deal further with the case." (citing United States v.
Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906))).
106 See supra note 56 (describing the circuit split regarding the scope-of-employment
question).
107 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
108 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
109 See Stephen J. Cowen, Comment, Appellate Review of SLUSA Remands After CAFA, 73
U. CHI. L. REv. 321, 326-32 (2006) (describing the circuit split in detail).
110 Id. at 325.
111 See id. at 324.
112 See id.
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court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether SLUSA ac-
tually preempted the state law claims."1 13 After it made that decision,
it "'had nothing else to do: dismissal and remand [were] the only op-
tions."' 1 14 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that having only those two
options did not mean that the district court lacked "adjudicatory com-
petence" but rather that it had completed its work and lacked jurisdic-
tion over the remainder of the claim.11 5
The district court's reasoning in Foster was similar. It focused on
the proper removal of the case and noted that it properly had jurisdic-
tion at the time of removal.1 1 6 Kircher, however, foreclosed the possi-
bility that such a rationale could permit the appellate court to review a
remand order.'1 7 The Supreme Court in Kircher fully recounted the
Seventh Circuit's argument:
As the Court of Appeals put it, once the District Court had
made that substantive decision of no preclusion in this case, it was
time for the court to bow out, not because it had lacked "adjudica-
tory competence" to begin with but because it had completed its
work: "Once a court does all that the statute authorizes, there is no
adjudicatory competence to do more. That is not the 'lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction' that authorizes a remand. Otherwise every
federal suit, having been decided on the merits, would be dismissed
'for lack of jurisdiction' because the court's job was finished." This
remand, the court concluded, was therefore not for want ofjurisdic-
tion, and review was not barred by § 1447(d).
To satisfy itself that its decision made "practical sense," the
court proposed that the Act reserves to the Federal Judiciary the
exclusive authority to make the preclusion decision. Treating re-
mand orders in this context as immunized from appeal by
§ 1447(d) would thus mean that "a major substantive issue in the
case [would] escape review," since it would not be open to resolu-
tion in the state court subject to review by this Court. 118
The Court then vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision because
the only ground on which the district court could have remanded was
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which would have resulted in
§ 1447(d) precluding appellate review." 9 The Court explained that
Congress's policy "opposes 'interruption of the litigation of the merits
of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions ofjurisdiction
113 Id. at 331.
114 Id. (quoting Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2004)).
115 Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850.
116 See Foster v. Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,
2008).
117 See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 639 (2006).
118 Id. at 639 (internal citations omitted).
119 See id.
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of the district court to which the cause is removed."' 120 Ultimately,
the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's view that the district court's
decision to remand was based on a substantive ruling after which the
court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the re-
mainder of the case. 121
The Supreme Court's decision in Kircher prevents a district
court's decision to remand pursuant to § 2679(d) (3) from being re-
viewable as long as § 1447(d) prohibits appellate review of remand
orders. 122 That remand is unreviewable because Kircherprevents a dis-
trict court from successfully claiming that it was not exercising its juris-
diction to determine jurisdiction but was, instead, examining the
scope-of-employment issue on the merits and then "bowing out" of
the case because it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the remaining
claims. 123 The district court is almost certainly correct that the scope-
of-employment issue was properly before it because the Westfall Act
permits the government to remove a case from state court for deter-
mination of that issue. 124 However, the scope-of-employment ques-
tion was properly before the court only for the purpose of determining
its own jurisdiction over the case, just as the preclusion issue was prop-
erly before the district court in Kircher for the same limited purpose.
Proper removal does not preclude a subsequent remand order from
being based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it make
§ 1447(d) inapplicable. 125
The district court in Foster also noted that its remand was not for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not made pursuant to
§ 1447(c).126 This argument, however, neither negates applicability
of § 1447(d) nor makes the remand order reviewable because, accord-
ing to both Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca127 and Kircher, basing a
remand on a statute other than the general removal statute does not
120 Id. at 640 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)).
121 See id. at 644 ("[T]he district court's order comes because its adjudicatory power
has been exercised and its work is done. But its adjudicatory power is simply its authority
to determine its own jurisdiction to deal further with the case.").
122 See id. at 639.
123 Compare id. (relinquishing jurisdiction after "complet[ing] its work"), with Foster v.
Hill, No. 08 C 1164, 2008 WL 4442605, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008) (relinquishing
jurisdiction after examining the scope-of-employment issue).
124 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (3) (2006) (allowing
plaintiffs to petition the court for certification of the scope-of-employment question).
125 See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 639 ("This remand... [was] not for want ofjurisdiction, and
review was not barred by § 1447(d).").
126 See Foster, 2008 WL 4442605, at *4 ("[W]e emphasize that we are expressly remand-
ing this action based solely upon the mandate in Section 2679(d) (3) and not because of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal.").
127 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) (noting that, regardless of the statute pursuant to which it
is ordered, a remand to state court is not reviewable).
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remove that order from the scope of § 1447(d).1 28 Because of that
precedent, remands made pursuant to statutory mandates other than
§ 1447(c) are not immune from the rule that a remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is not reviewable on appeal. 129
2. A Problem Without a Solution: Three Theoretical, but Ultimately
Unworkable, Ways to Make the Scope-of-Employment Decision
Reviewable
As briefly discussed above, one solution to the circularity problem
is to consider the federal district court's scope-of-employment deci-
sion binding on the state court when the federal court first issues the
decision. In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., the Supreme Court ex-
plained that a federal court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
"may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same personal ju-
risdiction issue in state court. 1 30 The Court also indicated in dicta
that a decision on subject matter jurisdiction could preclude the par-
ties from relitigating that issue in state court.13' On the other hand,
authority exists for the proposition that a nonreviewable jurisdictional
determination by a federal court does not bind a state court.13 2 Mak-
ing the § 2679(d) (3) remand reviewable would, therefore, be one way
to make the federal court's scope-of-employment decision controlling;
by binding the state court with that decision, the Westfall Act's circu-
128 See id. ("Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Con-
gress is 'aware of the universality of th[e] practice' of denying appellate review of remand
orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal." (quoting United States v. Rice,
327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946))); see also Kircher, 547 U.S. at 648 (holding that a remand order
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2006) is
unreviewable).
129 See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128-29 (1995) (holding
that a remand order based on one of the grounds of § 1447(c) is unreviewable, regardless
of whether the remand is pursuant to § 1441 or another statute). "Section 1447(d) applies
'not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute],
but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well.'" Id. at 128
(quoting Rice, 327 U.S. at 752); see also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Frumenti Dev. Corp.,
857 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rice, 327 U.S. at 742, and holding that § 1447(c)
precluded review of a remand order even though it was made "pursuant to a special statute
creating federal subject matterjurisdiction and granting a ight to remove a case from state
court where federal interests were implicated").
130 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999).
131 See id. ("Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation, however, may also at-
tend a federal court's subject-matter determination.").
132 See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 646-47 (explaining that "what a state court could do in the
first place it may also do on remand" and arguing that collateral estoppel does not apply to
unreviewable decisions); Foster v. Hill, 497 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) ("We are well
aware of the odd procedural posture that this result will create as the case goes forward.
The case will now return to state court. But because the parties have been prevented by
statute from any appellate review of the district court's scope of employment decision,
issue preclusion cannot be invoked in the state court on the question of whether Hill was
acting within the scope of his employment when he attacked Foster." (citations omitted)).
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larity problem would be solved. The problem, though, lies in making
the federal court's scope-of-employment determination reviewable.
Statutory exceptions, mandamus, and the Waco doctrine are three
ways in which a decision to remand can become reviewable, but none
of those effectively solve the Westfall Act's circularity problem.
Statutory Exceptions. The Court permits explicit statutory excep-
tions to § 1447(d) if Congress expressly overrides § 1447(d)'s prohibi-
tion on appellate review of remand orders. 133 Such an exception,
however, must be unequivocal in the statutory language. The Court
found that an exception applied in Osborn v. Haley,1 34 which dealt with
the Westfall Act. In that case, the Court found that § 2679(d) (2)
made an Attorney General's certification for scope of employment
conclusive for purposes of removal. 13 5 The Court argued that the
anti-shuttling provision of § 2679(d) (2) indicated Congress's explicit
intention to override § 1447(d)'s prohibition on appellate review.136
Section 2679(d) (3) contains no similar anti-shuttling provision, and
the Court in Osborn specifically distinguished the two sections of the
Westfall Act, indicating that the statutory exception to § 1447(d) rec-
ognized by Osborn does not control in a situation arising under
§ 2679(d) (3).137
Mandamus. A writ of mandamus is utilized to "confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it
to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so,"138 but "appellate
courts are reluctant to interfere with the decision of a lower court on
jurisdictional questions which it was competent to decide." 139 Al-
though this writ may be available for "remands not authorized by
§ 1447(c),' '1 40 mandamus does not apply to remands for which
§ 1447(d) prohibits review because "mandamus is the 'or otherwise'
of which § 1447(d) speaks." 141 Courts differ as to whether a remand
order that is not covered by § 1447(d) is a final order (and thus ap-
pealable) or an interlocutory order (and thus reviewable only through
a writ of mandamus).142 In the Westfall Act context, however,
133 See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 239-41 (2007).
134 Id.
135 See id. at 241-43.
136 See id. at 244 ("[O]f the two antishuttling commands, § 1447(d) and
§ 2679(d) (2) ..... [the latter] controls.").
137 See id. at 241-42.
138 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (citation omitted).
139 Id.
140 In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992).
141 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006) ("An order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .. ").
142 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1996) (holding that there
could be an appeal under § 1291 and that the Thermtron holding that a remand order is
not a final judgment would not apply in a situation where § 1447(d) does not preclude
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§ 1447(d) bars review. A writ of mandamus thus does not apply to
these cases.
The Waco Doctrine. In the 1934 decision of City of Waco v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Supreme Court held that a substan-
tive order included in a decree containing several orders-one of
which was a remand-could be subject to appellate review, thereby
removing it from § 1447(d)'s general prohibition on the reviewability
of remand orders. 143 In that case, the order dismissing a party, which
preceded remand, was reviewable because "in logic and in fact the
decree of dismissal preceded that of remand and was made by the
District Court while it had control of the cause." 144 The Waco Court,
and a later Ninth Circuit decision that applied its reasoning, 14 5 fo-
cused on the conclusive nature of the decision on the parties.
146
Those courts allowed review because "hold[ing] otherwise would de-
prive [the party] of its right to appeal a substantive determination of
contract law." 147
This doctrine provides, at best, questionable justification for mak-
ing remand under § 2679(d) (3) reviewable because (1) the Supreme
Court, in dicta, has called the continuing validity of the Waco doctrine
into question, 148 and (2) if the scope-of-employment decision is
merely jurisdictional under § 2679(d) (3), then it is not a decision on
another issue that conclusively adjudicates the rights of the parties
under Waco. This exception could, however, potentially apply in Sce-
nario 3, in which the state court decides scope of employment and
substitutes the United States as a party prior to removal. 149
In the Westfall Act context, the district court could seemingly
enter a decree with two separate orders: one dismissing the United
States as a party and the other remanding the case to the state court.
review of the remand order); 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.11 (2d ed. 1992).
143 See Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143-44 (1934); see also
Thomas C. Goodhue, Note, Appellate Review of Remand Orders: A Substantive/Jurisdictional
Conundrum, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1325-27 (2006) (chronicling how the Waco doctrine
became established law in federal circuit courts).
144 Waco, 293 U.S. at 143.
145 See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 277 (9th
Cir. 1984).
146 See Waco, 293 U.S. at 143; Pelleport Investors, Inc., 741 F.2d at 277.
147 Pelleport Investors, Inc., 741 F.2d at 277.
148 See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 645 n.13 (2006) ("Without pass-
ing on the continued vitality of [Waco] in light of § 1447(d), we note that on its own terms
it is distinguishable.").
149 See supra text accompanying notes 59-64. In Scenario 3, the Attorney General does
not remove prior to the state court's determination of scope of employment. The state
court certifies scope of employment and substitutes the United States as a party. The case
is then removed to the federal court with the United States as a party defendant, giving the
federal court a party to dismiss.
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The former could be a separate order that conclusively determines
the scope-of-employment issue, which would enable appellate re-
view.150 This solution, however, still requires a significant waste of ju-
dicial resources because it requires both the state and federal court to
decide the scope-of-employment issue in the same case. Furthermore,
although the Waco exception may enable review of the district court's
decision to dismiss the United States as a party, it does not enable
review of the remand itself.15 1 As a result, this "solution" creates a
difficulty whereby the parties can appeal the decision to dismiss the
United States but the state court would remain bound by a federal
trial court's decision that essentially reviewed its own determination.
III
Two IMMOBILE POINTS CREATE AN UNTENABLE DILEMMA
REQUIRING A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
This Note has demonstrated that the only reasonable judicial so-
lution to the circularity problem is to read the Westfall Act as making
the first court's scope-of-employment decision final and binding. Un-
fortunately, two competing doctrines of Supreme Court jurisprudence
make this solution unlikely until one of them changes. First, the com-
mand of Kircher dictates that an unreviewable decision cannot bind a
coordinate court. 152  Second, the jurisprudence surrounding
§ 1447(d) indicates that a remand order for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is unreviewable. 153  Because a remand pursuant to
§ 2679(d) (3) can only be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that
order cannot be reviewable. 154 Ultimately this remand issue causes
the Westfall Act's intractable circularity problem. The solution is eva-
sive-one of these principles must yield to the other in the context of
the Westfall Act. Support exists for the persistence of both indepen-
dently: it is unfair to bind parties to a judgment that they had no op-
portunity to appeal and it is logical that the courts do not encourage
interruptions to litigation solely to review jurisdictional questions.
150 See Waco, 293 U.S. at 143-44 (finding that an order of dismissal preceding an order
of remand was reviewable given its conclusive effect on the parties); see also Powerex Corp.
v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 236 (2007) (finding that no separate order
existed for the Court to review but implicitly supporting Waco's application to a situation in
which a court issues two separate orders).
151 The fact that the reviewed order necessarily affects remand does not mean that the
appellate court bypasses § 1447(d) to review a remand order. See Waco, 293 U.S. at 143-44
("A reversal cannot affect the order of remand. . . ."); see also Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 236
(cautioning that the Waco doctrine does not permit an appeal if there is no order separate
from the remand order (citing Kircher, 547 U.S. at 645-46 n.13)).
152 See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 647.
153 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.D.1.
154 See id.
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Ultimately, this Note cannot argue that one of these doctrines
should yield to the other in all situations. The inherent problems
demonstrate the potentially unfortunate outcomes of statutes drafted
without keeping these two long-standing rules in mind.1 55 The best
solution, therefore, is that Congress revisit the Westfall Act and other
similarly drafted statutes with both rules-Kircher's requirement of re-
viewability for a decision to bind parties and § 1447(d)'s general pro-
hibition on appellate review of remand orders for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction-in mind. Fortunately, congressional precedent
exists for such drafting, as legislators have demonstrated that they are
acutely aware of both the general prohibition on the reviewability of
remand orders and ways in which statutory language can override that
prohibition.156
Adding a clause to the Westfall Act similar to those in the statutes
that override § 1447(d)'s prohibition on appellate review is one ave-
nue through which Congress could address the Westfall Act's circular-
ity problem-but it is not the only one. Another congressional
solution to the circularity problem is to amend the statute in such a
way as to elucidate which court had the ultimate responsibility for de-
termining the scope-of-employment issue on the merits. Congress
could amend § 2679(d) (3) as follows:
In the event the petition is filed in a civil action or proceeding
pending in a State court, the action or proceeding shall be removed
without bond by the Attorney General to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place in
155 The Westfall Act is not the only statute drafted in this way. The SLUSA at issue in
Kircher created the potential for a similar problem because its language intertwined the
merits-based and jurisdictional facts. See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 642-43. Ultimately, Kircher
resolved that particular problem, but the statutory failure to acknowledge issues of review-
ability and remand had originally created the problem in Kircher
Similarly, 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2 (2006), regarding the Tennessee Valley Authority's re-
sponsibility to defend suits brought against its defendant employees acting within the
scope of their employment, reads almost identically to the Westfall Act, creating the poten-
tial for the same circularity problem that arose in Foster. Other scope-of-employment-re-
lated statutes create a circularity problem similar to that which arose before Osborn because
the statutes do not render the Attorney General's certification conclusive for purposes of
removal. E.g., § 22 U.S.C. 2702(c) (2006); 38 U.S.C. § 7316(c) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 5055(f) (3) (2006). But see 42 U.S.C. § 233(p) (4) (B) ("The certification of the Attorney
General ... shall conclusively establish such facts for purposes of jurisdiction pursuant to
this subsection.").
156 E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2006) ("The United States shall be an indispensable party
to, and may be joined in, any such proceeding involving trust land with the right to remove
the action to the United States district court for the district in which the land is situated,
according to the procedure in section 1446 of title 28, and the United States shall have the
right to appeal from any order of remand entered in such action."); 30 U.S.C. § 816 (a)(1)
(2006) ("Upon the filing of the record after such remand proceedings, the jurisdiction of
the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and degree shall be final, except that the
same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States, as provided in
section 1254 of title 28.").
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which it is pending for the purpose of making a final decision, on the
merits, regarding whether the defendant-employee was acting within the scope
of his employment. If, in considering the petition, the district court
determines, on the merits, that the employee was not acting within
the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding
shall be remanded to the State court.157
These changes would clarify that the federal district court is the
one and only court with jurisdiction to determine the scope-of-employ-
ment issue on the merits. This explicit statutory language would effec-
tively eliminate the circularity problem. Either of these solutions is
workable, and both are preferable to the current state of the statute,
which creates the potential for further Foster-like circularity problems.
CONCLUSION
This Note has presented, through Foster v. Hill, an examination of
a circularity problem created by the interaction between the Westfall
Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Although I have used Foster and the
Westfall Act as vehicles to explore this issue, the problem and its solu-
tions apply much more broadly. When Congress drafts statutes with-
out keeping the doctrines of reviewability, remand, and jurisdiction in
mind, the result is quite possibly a collision of two immobile Supreme
Court precedents-one that states that a remand order for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is unreviewable, and another that dictates
that an unreviewable decision cannot be binding. When Congress
drafts statutes that require a federal court to undertake a preliminary
factual determination to decide its jurisdiction and does not provide a
solution to the inevitable reviewability problem, it creates the poten-
tial for a case to travel indefinitely between state and federal court the
way that Foster has since 2004.
The solution is not easy. In the absence of a congressional
amendment of the statute, the courts must make a decision that up-
holds one of these rules and denigrates the other. The most likely
outcome in the Westfall Act context is to forgo Kircher and allow
courts to create federal common law that makes the first scope-of-em-
ployment decision binding. This solution is, admittedly, imperfect.
But, without that solution or a statutory revision, cases can continue to
travel an infinite loop between federal and state courts without any
relief for either the plaintiff or the justice system.
157 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (3) (2006) (proposed alterations in italics).
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